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Viewing cable 09USNATO579,

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Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09USNATO579**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09USNATO579	2009-12-09 08:22	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Mission USNATO

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article4028323.ece>

VZCZCXRO1207
PP RUEHDBU RUEHSL
DE RUEHNO #0579/01 3430822
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 090822Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3720
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHND/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

09.12.2009: NATO-RUSSIA: RESPONDING TO RUSSIAS LATEST DRAFT
TREATY LIMITING THE DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS ABROAD
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 000579
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2019
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [NATO](#) [RS](#)
REF: MOSCOW 2878

Classified By: Ambassador Daalder for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

¶1. (U) This is a request for guidance. Please see para 7.

¶2. (C) Summary and comment: At the December 4 NATO-Russia Council Ministerial, Russia presented to NATO a draft treaty that would commit the Alliance to use the NRC to address threats to Allies security and prevent NATO from stationing armed forces on the territory of its Central and Eastern European members. The treaty avoids mentioning the OSCE and differs from Russias proposed European Security Treaty mainly in specifying the NRC as the forum for discussion. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov asked ministers that Allies consider discussing the new treaty with Russia at subsequent NRC meetings. After reviewing the document, Allies initial response has centered on the need for the NRC to focus instead on the ministers decisions to work on agreed areas of practical cooperation and start a Joint Review of common security threats. The U.S. should respond by urging Russia to comply with existing treaties before suggesting new ones, and by keeping the NRC focused on initiatives already agreed. End summary and comment.

Russia Hands NATO a Draft Treaty

¶3. (C) During the December 4 NATO-Russia Council Ministerial (NRC), Russian FM Sergey Lavrov presented Allies with a draft agreement between NATO members and Russia that would, among other things, limit the deployment of troops to certain European countries. Lavrov said that Russia would not publicize the document, looked forward to Allied responses, and hoped the topic would be discussed in the NRC (full text in para 8).

¶4. (C) The heart of the Russian proposal is an article that would commit NATO not to station significant forces in the Central and Eastern European countries that joined the Alliance after 1997. The proposal also commits members to use the NRC to address threats to their security, and selectively cites previous NATO-Russia agreements, leaving out key elements such as the 1997 Founding Acts numerous references to the OSCE. The draft treaty appears to be what the Russian MFA had in mind when it said recently that the GOR wanted a strategic-level political declaration to reorient the NATO-Russia relationship (reftel).

¶5. (C) PermReps have reacted by reiterating that the focus needed to be not on a new treaty but on implementing decisions made at the NRC Ministerial to launch the Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges and work on areas of practical cooperation included in the NRC Work Plan for 2010. A fuller Allied discussion of the Russian proposal will take place on December 14 in advance of the NATO Secretary Generals December 15-17 trip to Moscow.

Comment

¶6. (C) Russias latest proposed treaty, along with the draft European Security Treaty (EST) released by Moscow just days earlier, appear designed to undermine NATO and the OSCE. The GOR proposal is clearly a non-starter for Allies, but Russia may hope to sow division and raise questions about Alliance unity. Despite Allies unanimous response that the proposed EST should be discussed in the OSCE, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain have commented that they could also consider discussing the EST proposal in the NRC. Russia may hope to get a similar reaction to its newest draft treaty.

¶7. (C) The U.S. should join Allies at the NRC in urging Russia to comply with existing treaties before suggesting new ones. We should emphasize to the Russians that the NRC needs to focus on the recently approved Work Plan for 2010 and the Joint Review of 21st Century Common Security Challenges, documents that were endorsed by all 29 NRC ministers on December 4, instead of debating proposals designed to undermine NATO and the OSCE. Russia needs to hear the message again that the OSCE, not the NRC, is the appropriate forum for such discussions. We request any additional input

from Washington by OOB Brussels time December 11.

Treaty Text

18. (C) Below is the English text provided to Allies on December 4:

AGREEMENT ON BASIC PRINCIPLES GOVERNING RELATIONS AMONG NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL MEMBER STATES IN THE SECURITY SPHERE
The Member States of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) - Parties to this Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the Parties), committed to promote friendly relations between States for the benefit of a lasting and comprehensive peace in the Euro-Atlantic region founded on the principles of democracy, market economy and the rule of law;
recognizing that uniting efforts of all the Parties is indispensable to respond effectively to contemporary challenges and threats to security in a globalized and interdependent world;
seeking to bring their relations to a new level through equal partnership, solidarity and mutual trust in the sphere of security;
noting that security interests of each Party call to improve effectiveness of multilateral cooperation, enhance stability, predictability and transparency in the political and military sphere;
reaffirming their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; the 1975 Helsinki Final Act adopted at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation; the 1994 Code of Conduct on Political-Military Aspects of Security; the 1999 Charter on European Security and the Rome Declaration
&NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality⁸ signed by the Heads of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation in 2002;
have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Without prejudice to obligations emanating from their membership in international organizations, military alliances, coalitions or other associations, the Parties shall be guided in their relations by the principles of cooperation and equal and indivisible security. They shall not enhance their own security at the expense of the security of others.

In their relations the Parties shall peacefully settle any international dispute as well as refrain from the threat or use of force in any way inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

In the framework of the NRC the Parties, acting in their national capacity, shall establish and maintain mechanisms for harmonizing measures aimed at preventing and settling conflicts in the Euro-Atlantic region.

The Parties shall regularly exchange their assessments of contemporary threats and challenges to security and agree, if necessary, on measures aimed to neutralize these threats and challenges. These measures shall not infringe upon legitimate security interests of other States.

In case of a situation of threats to security of or the use of force against one of the Parties emerges, an extraordinary meeting of the NRC shall be immediately convened at the request of any Party in order, to hold urgent consultations and, if necessary, agree on measures that may be required to bring this situation to an end.

Article 3

The Parties shall not consider each other as adversaries. They shall maintain only such a level of military capacity, which is commensurate with their legitimate security needs, and shall perform defense planning in a way that it does not threaten the security of other Parties.

The Parties shall maintain a dialogue on defense planning in order to avoid incidents related to military activities.

Article 4

The Russian Federation and all the Parties that were Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as of 27 May 1997, respectively, shall refrain from stationing on a permanent basis (including temporary deployment for more than 42 days during the calendar year) of their substantial combat forces (at the level of combat brigade (combat support battalion), air wing/air regiment, helicopter battalion/helicopter regiment or above, or having more than 41 battle tanks or 188 armoured combat vehicles, or 90 pieces of artillery of 100 millimeters caliber and above, or 24 combat aircraft, or 24 attack helicopters) on the territory of all the other States in Europe in addition to the forces stationed on that territory as of 27 May 1997. In exceptional cases, when situations arise in which a threat to security of one or more Parties should be neutralized, such deployments can take place with the consent of all the Parties to this Agreement in the framework of the NRC.

Article 5

The Parties shall view arms control and confidence- and security-building measures as a material basis of stability and security. They shall cooperate with a view to ensure viability, timely adaptation and advancement of arms control regimes.

Article 6

This Agreement shall not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting the primary responsibility of the Security Council of the United Nations for maintaining international peace and security, nor the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 7

This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Depositary, which shall notify all other signatory States of any such instrument deposited.

This Agreement shall enter into force from the date of deposit of instruments of ratification with the Depositary by more than a half of the signatory States. With respect to a State that deposited its instrument of ratification at a later date this Agreement shall enter into force from the date of its deposit.

Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Agreement, have jeopardized its supreme interests. A Party to this Agreement intending to withdraw from the Agreement shall give notice of its decision to do so to the Depositary and all other Parties to this Agreement. Such notice shall be given at least (120) days prior to the intended withdrawal from this Agreement. It shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the Party to this Agreement regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

This Agreement has been drawn up in Russian, English and French, all texts being equally authentic, and shall be deposited in the archive of the Depositary, which is the Government of Duly certified copies of this Agreement will be forwarded by the above-mentioned Government to the Governments of other signatory States.

In witness thereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Agreement.

Done in (the city of .) this (XX) day of (XX) two thousand and (XX).

End text.

DAALDER